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many   organizations   and   companies.  Writing   crosscutting 
functions in complex software should take advantage of the 
modularity   offered   by   new   software   development 

















However,   other   institutions   consult   their   operations 
through   these   same   servers.   The   ignorance   of   the 
developers   concerning   the   vulnerabilities   on   web 
applications,  highlights   the  weakness  of   these  software 
systems.   OWASP's   Top   Ten   listing   references   two 
common   attacks   on   web   applications:   Cross   Site 
Scripting (XSS) and SQL injection [1]. 
SQL   injection   is   a   technique   where   a   would­be 
intruder modifies an existing SQL request to post hidden 
data, to crush important values, or to process dangerous 
orders   for   the   database.   This   is   made   when   the 
application retrieves data sent by the Internet users, and 
uses it directly to build a SQL request. 
Cross  Site  Scripting  (XSS)   is  an  attack exploiting a 
weakness   of   a   web   site   that   fails   to   validate   the 
parameters   entered   by   the   users.   XSS   uses   various 
techniques for injecting (and executing), scripts written in 
languages such as  JavaScript  or VBScript.  The goal  of 
these attacks  is   to keep cookies  containing  information 




defends   the   idea   that   security   should   be   taken   into 
consideration during all   the phases of   the development 
cycle   and   must   influence   deeply   the   design   of   the 
application. 
Aspect­Oriented   Programming   (AOP)   is   a   good 
candidate for this feature [2]. AOP has been proposed as a 
technique for improving concerns separation in software 
systems   and   for   adding   crosscutting   functionalities 
without changing the business logic of the software. AOP 
provides   specific   language   mechanisms   that   make   it 




Our   main   objective   is   to   design   and   implement   a 
security   aspect   called   AProSec   to   deal   with   SQL 
Injection and XSS Cross Site Scripting web attacks. Our 
proposal   is   based   on   the   aspect   programming  models 
offered   by   AspectJ   and   JBoss   AOP   and   defines   the 
elements necessary for the defense of a web site against 
these   attacks.   These   elements   will   appear   as   AspectJ 
aspects woven at compile­time and, in a second version, 
at run­time with the JBoss AOP framework [3] [4].
Our  work   is  motivated   by   the   need   to   fill   the   gap 
between   an   integrated   version   of   a   web   server   with 
security   functions   and   a   modular   version   with   AOP 
techniques. This paper leads to the definition of a model 






the  web application architecture.  Section  4  defines  our 
AProsec Aspect and its integration with the web server 
architecture. Section 5 details the difference between two 
weaving   approaches   with   AspectJ   and   JBoss   AOP. 




There   are   a   lot   of   devises   to   implement   perimetral 
security,   firewalls,   IDS,   IPS,   etc.  Nevertheless   a   great 
number of organizations offer a web page to the public, 
leaving   the  port   80  open   to   any  person  who  wants   to 
access. The web service offers different kinds of services 
as information about the company, but it is also a way to 
send data to the organization. In most of   the cases  the 
system is developed "in house" with no security concerns 
at all.




application   security   flaws.   The   primary   aim   of   the 
OWASP   Top   10   is   to   educate   developers,   designers, 
architects  and  organizations  about   the  consequences  of 
the   most   common   web   application   security 
vulnerabilities.
The list  includes cross site scripting, injection flaws, 
malicious   file   execution,   cross   site   request   forgery 
(CSRF),   insecure   direct   object   reference,   information 
leakage   and   improper   error   handling,   broken 












malicious  SQL  commands   into   parameters   in   order   to 
trick   the   web   application   for   forwarding   a   malicious 
query to the database. As a result of this kind of attack, 




comments.   In  order   to  explain  each   technique,  we will 
consider   the   case   in   which   a   web   application 
authenticates a user by executing the following query:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='alice' and 
password = 'toto'
Tautology   looks   for   a   disjunction   in   the  WHERE 
clause  of  a  select  or  update  statement.   In   the previous 
example   it   can   be   made   by   adding   the   statement 
'a'='a', resulting in the following query:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE user='alice' and 







SELECT body, results FROM reports
When using this statement with our example, we will 
obtain the following query:
SELECT body, results FROM reports
UNION
SELECT login, password FROM users 
As result   the query  will  display  the  reports   list,  but 
also the database users in the application.
The  additional   statements   technique   attempts   to   add 
SQL   statements   or   commands   to   a   SQL   query.   For 
example:
SELECT  *  FROM  users  WHERE  name='alice'  and 









SELECT * FORM users WHERE name = 'alice' and 
password = 'toto' 
An attacker could transform by this way:
SELECT * FORM users WHERE name = 'admin' -- and 
password = ''









of   web   applications   that   do   not   validate   the   output 
generated by a user’s input. The attack is known as XSS 
attack,   and   not   CSS   attack,   to   avoid   confusion   with 
Cascading Style Sheets. 
As an example, consider a web application that gives 
the   visiting   user   the   opportunity   to   send   a   comment 
through a guest book.  A malicious user can introduce the 
following   characters   “<!--“.   After   some   time,   these 
characters are mixed with other users' input, resulting in 
the following content in the guess book:
Very good web page, dude!
<!--








  for (q=0; q < 1000; q++)
    window.open(http://www.hot.example);
</script>
This is an example of a very simple XSS attack. An 
attacker   can   introduce   scripts   that   can   take   session 
cookies of a user and send them to the attacker. With this 
information the attacker can use the system as the original 
user.  An attacker  can  also mislead   the  user   to  another 
website   and   try   to   extract   personal   or   confidential 
information.
B.  Aspect Oriented Programming
The  domain   of   aspect­oriented   programming   (AOP) 
appeared   in  1996   [1]   [2].   It  was  pioneered  by  Gregor 
Kiczales   and   his   team,   then   at   the   Xerox   Palo   Alto 
Research   Center.   While   original   and   innovative,   the 
domain of AOP inherits results from other programming 




studying  the  code of  Tomcat,  Gregor  Kiczales  and  his 
team   discovered   that,   while   some   functionality   was 
cleanly modularized in classes, other, such as user session 
management or logging, appeared in several classes. This 
phenomenon   is   known   as  code   scattering.   When 
developers   want   to   fix   a   bug   or   to   upgrade   such 




this   scattering   is   that   a   given  method  mixes   concerns 
related   to   different   functionalities.   This   second 
phenomenon is known as code tangling. Once again this 





re­designed   to   prevent   scattering   and   tangling?  While 
open, the answer to this question is usually no. The idea 
is that a complex piece of software such as Tomcat may 
be   decomposed   according   to   many   criteria:   the 
decomposition   may   be   data­driven,   process­driven, 
driven   by   various   requirements   such   as   security, 
integration   with   existing   information   systems,   or 
performance. It happens that one is chosen by designers 
and   that   the   other   decompositions  may   not   fit   in   the 
scheme   introduced   by   the   first   one,   leading   to 
functionalities being scattered and tangled. The purpose 
of AOP is then to provide a solution to solve these issues.
An   analogy   of   how   the   different   concerns   can   be 






so   they   can   be   developed   and   included   independently. 
Authentication,   performance,   security   and   logging   are 
commonly used concerns and are always spread through 
the application's code.
AOP,   as   a   new   programming   paradigm,   introduces 
notions such as an aspect, a join point, a pointcut and an 






etc.).   Aspect­oriented   extensions   exist   for   many 
languages, object­oriented or procedural. 
Aspects  can  be   applied   (the   term used  by   the  AOP 
community   is  woven)   at   compile­time   or   at   run­time. 




parts:  a  server  where the web application is  running, a 
database   server  where   the   application's   information   is 
stored   and   a   bunch   of   clients  willing   to   use   the  web 
application.
Figure 2: The architecture of an unprotected web application server
Fig.   2   shows   how   a  web   application   server   (WAS) 
interacts  with   clients   and   database   servers.  When   the 
client sends a request, it goes directly to the WAS and if it 
isn't  validated,   it  can  cause  some unexpected  behavior. 
When needed,  the WAS forms a new request using the 
unvalidated   parameters   from  the   client,   forwarding   the 












The   AProSec   aspect   can   be   used   by   any   AOP 
framework   and  is   composed   of   three   parts.   First,   an 
advice (the added code)  defines  the validation process. 
Second, the way AProSec validates the requests depends 
on   the   options   that   the   administrator   selects   on   the 
configuration file, as shown in Section IV­B. Finally, the 













several  syntaxes   that   should   be   validated:   double   and 
single   quotes,   SQL   Injection,   and  XSS.  In   the  HTTP 
requests, we validate the parameter value to avoid code 
injection  and   invalid  HTML tags.  For DB queries,   the 
validation   is   made   by   analyzing   the   query   string   to 






SELECT  *  FROM  users  WHERE  user='alice'  and 
password = 'toto' or 'a' = 'a'
The  attacker  should have input  alice  as the user and 
toto' or 'a' = 'a  as   the password.  AProSec would 
validate   this   and   change   the   password   to  toto\' 
or \'a\' = \'a taking the whole string as the password 
and not as two operations.
SELECT  *  FROM  users  WHERE  user='alice'  and 
password = 'toto\' or \'a\' = \'a'
As  for   the XSS, all   the  tags  the user  may  input  are 
transformed to HTML code preventing the attacker from 
introducing   any   tags.  Using   the  XSS   example,   in   the 
input:
<script>
  for (q=0; q < 1000; q++)
window.open(http://www.hot.example);
</script>











the  queries   so   they  do  not  contain  any  comments   and 








analyzes   all   the   conditions   in   the   query,   changing   the 
“always true” conditions for “always false” ones. It also 
removes any semicolons (;) found in the query, to prevent 




This   section   describes  the  configuration   file.   Even 
though   single   and   double   quotes   are  part   of   the  SQL 
injection, the AProSec aspect manages them separately. 









<!ELEMENT validator (validateQuotes, 
validateApost, validateSQLInj, 
validateXSS,validTag*)>
 <!ELEMENT validateQuotes (#PCDATA)>
 <!ELEMENT validateApost (#PCDATA)>
 <!ELEMENT validateSQLInj (#PCDATA)>
 <!ELEMENT validateXSS (#PCDATA)>






validateQuotes:  To   validate   double   quotes   (“)   from   a 
parameter.   If   this   option   is   enabled,   every   time   the 
applications  receives  a   form or  URL parameter,   it  will 
convert   the   double   quote   (“)   to   “backslash   double 
quote” (\”).
validateApost:  To   validate   single   quotes   (')   from   a 
parameter.   If   this   option   is   enabled,   every   time   the 
application   receives   a   form or  URL  parameter,   it  will 
convert   the   single   quote   (')   to   “backslash   single 
quote” (\').
validateSQLInj:  To validate the query for possible SQL 
Injection.   If   this   option   is   enabled,   every   time   the 
application issues a database call, the query is validated 
to   prevent   unexpected   queries   to   execute,   avoiding 
“always true” conditions and the use of semicolons and 
comments in the query.
validateXSS:  To validate user   input  for  XSS attacks.   If 
this option is enabled, every time the application receives 
a form or URL parameter, this parameter is validated and 





for   every   tag   found   in   the   parameter,   this   validation 
checks if  it  should accept  the tag and transform it to a 
safe tag. This tag must be used for every HTML tag the 
administrator wants to accept. Even when this option is 
enabled,   the   parameters   in   the   tag   cannot   contain   any 
Javascript calls, as explained later.
A  safe  tag  is   the  one  that  will  not  be printed as  an 
HTML tag. For example, if a parameter contains the tag 
“<a href='#'> LINK </a>”, the filter will transform it 








onClick,  onChange,   etc.);   if   it   does,   it   will   be 
removed. For example, if we are accepting the  <a>  tag, 
the input: 
This  is  <a  href="#"  onClick="alert('Thank 
you!');">a link</a>. 
Will be transformed as: 
This is <a href="#">a link</a>. 
























pointcut dbWrite(String query): (call(* 
java.sql.Statement.addBatch(String))
  || call(* java.sql.Statement.execute(String))
  || call(* java.sql.Statement.executeQuery 
(String))
  || call(* java.sql.Statement.executeUpdate 
(String))) 
  && args(query);
pointcut getParameter(): call(String 
javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest.getParamet
er(String));
Object around(String query): dbWrite(query){
  Object ret = 
validator.Validator().validateQuery (proceed());
  return ret;
}
String around(): getParameter(){





JBoss  AOP  is a framework for  programming aspect­
oriented   applications   in   Java.   It   can   be   used   as   a 
standalone   framework  or  embedded  in   the  JBoss  J2EE 
server. Web applications running on this server can then 
take   advantage   of   the   aspect­oriented   features   of   the 
framework [4]. JBoss AOP is an open­source project that 





Both  modes  were  tested.  The main advantage of  the 
load time (or runtime) mode is that the application does 
not   need   any   manipulation   before   getting   it   in   the 
application server. Using the compile time mode, we need 
to   recompile   the   source   files   and   then   package   them 
before getting them to run in the application server.







  <bind pointcut="call(java.lang.String 
$instanceof{javax.servlet.http.HttpServletReques
t}->getParameter*(java.lang.String))">
    <interceptor 
class="interceptors.HTTPInterceptor"/>
  </bind>
  <bind pointcut="call(* 
$instanceof{java.sql.Statement}-> addBatch* 
(java.lang.String))">
    <interceptor class= 
"interceptors.QueryInterceptorQuery"/>
  </bind>
  <bind pointcut="call(* $instanceof 
{java.sql.Statement}-> execute* 
(java.lang.String))">
    <interceptor 
class="interceptors.QueryInterceptor"/>
  </bind>
  <bind pointcut="call(* $instanceof 
{java.sql.Statement}-> executeQuery* 
(java.lang.String))">
    <interceptor class= 
"interceptors.QueryInterceptor"/>
  </bind>
  <bind pointcut="call(* $instanceof 
{java.sql.Statement}-> executeUpdate* 
(java.lang.String))">







AProSec aspect.   It   is  a  simple application with a  poor 









First  we   tried   all   sorts   of   SQL   Injection   and  XSS 
attacks   we   had   information   about   to   see   how   the 
application behaved. Then we protected it with AProSec 
using   two   approaches:  AspectJ   and   JBoss  AOP.  After 
using AProSec we tried the same attacks and even some 






select  *  from  products  where  name  like 
'%parameter%';
When   the   application   runs   without   the   aspect,   an 
attacker could use the catalog search engine to display the 
users and passwords of the application.




select * from products where name like '%' union 
















show   any   informations   from   the   users   table   and     the 
query would be transformed to:
select * from products where name like '%\' 
union select * from users#;
Both  frameworks   (AspectJ   and   JBoss)  will   help   to 
reach  our  goal,  but  since  we prefer   to keep   the aspect 
working without the need of the source code, the runtime 
weaving   sounds   as   a   better   option,   compared   to   the 
compile time approach. This way, even if we do not have 
access   to   the   source   code   we   can   still   improve   our 
applications' security.
Typically,  the   downside   of   inserting   additional 





respond   with   and   without   AProSec,   and   the   average 
difference  between  both  was  of   about  0.0035  seconds, 
using all the possible validations in the aspect. These tests 
were  done  on  a  database   (MySQL)  with  over  100,000 
records and using a simple workstation for both, Database 
and Web Application Server. We expect that performance 







which  a  pre­programmed query  will  be  used,  allowing 
only the sentence that the programmer wants to define.
In other project, the authors propose to use a parse tree 
that   represents   the   parsed  SQL query  [7].   In  order   to 
achieve  this,   the SQL grammar has   to be known.  This 
technique produces one parse tree with the original query, 














prevented   from executing  on   the   database.   It's   success 
depends on the accuracy of the model generated during 
the first phase, and can be degraded when using certain 
types   of   code   obfuscation   or   query   development 
techniques [9].
SQL  DOM  technique   is   a   set   of   classes   that   are 
strongly­typed   to   a   database   schema  [10].   Instead   of 
string   manipulation,   these   classes   generate   SQL 
statements. The solution is based on an executable called 
sqldomgen,   which   generates   a   dynamic   link   library 
(DLL) based on the structure of the database. The DDL 
contains classes that  will  be used to construct  dynamic 
SQL statements  without manipulating any strings.  This 
technique   requires   the   learning   and   use   of   a   new 





this,   the   original   opcodes   of   the   computer   server   are 
transformed by a random key. If an attacker tries to inject 
code and it does not know the key, the machine will not 
execute   this   code,   causing   a   runtime   exception.   The 
security of this technique is dependent on the attacker not 
being able to discover the key. It requires the developers 
to   modify   the   application   to   use   the   randomized 
instructions.
Another  solution   is   the   use   of   application   IDS 
(Instruction Detection System)  [12]. This kind of IDS is 
oriented   to   supervise   specific   applications,   including 
SQL applications. The authors propose to use a Network 
IDS in order to look for invalid SQL statements  in the 
network   traffic.  With   these   type   of   systems   the   SQL 
commands that will be executed can be deciphered, and 
depending   on   which   columns   and   tables   are   been 
accessed, the IDS can conclude if it is an attack or not 




presents   a   detection   tool   that   does   not   require   the 
application source code to be modified [14]. It modifies 
the PHP runtime environment to detect injection attacks 
on   all   the   applications   running   on   the   server.   By 
modifying the runtime environment, the portability gets 
affected   [9].   The   authors   accept   that   a   separate 
implementation is needed for every platform.
The  advantage  of  AProSec,   in   comparison  with   the 
other projects, is that it is based on AOP and it considers 
both, SQL Injection and XSS in the same aspect. Also, 
when   using   JBoss  AOP   it   provides   runtime  weaving, 
allowing   the   administrator   to   incorporate   AProSec 
without recompiling the application. Once the application 
is running with AProSec, any change in the configuration 





functionalities   that   have   been   the   topic   of   an   aspect­
oriented   development,   one   can   find:   access   control, 
encryption, the adding of digital signatures, authorization 
and authentication  [15]  [16]  [17]  [18]  [19]  [20]. Most of 
the   implementations  described   in   these   studies   rely  on 
AspectJ [16] [17] [19]. 




the   intrusions   and   the   process   of   detecting   these 
intrusions.   Their   framework   consists   of   five   stages: 
identify   vulnerabilities   and   attacks;   model   attack 
scenarios   using  UML;  generate   the   intrusion  detection 
aspect (IDA) code using an aspect code generator; weave 
aspects   into   the   target   system;   test   and   deploy   the 






detect   cross­site   scripting.   Their   approach   relies   on 
sanitizing,   i.e.   replacing   special   characters   by   quoted 
ones,   the   input   data   submitted   by   users   to   web 
applications. The authors take the case of servlet­based 
web applications. When data is submitted to a servlet, one 
of   the   issues  which   are   raised   consists   in  determining 
whether it comes from an end­user or whether it comes 
from another servlet which delegates the request by mean 
of   the   transfer   mechanism   provided   by   the   servlet 
container.   In   the   latter   case,   data   is   supposed   to   be 
trustworthy as it simply originates from another part of 
the application. In this case, the sanitizing can be skipped 
in order   to save computation time. To achieve this,   the 
authors   propose   to   extend   the   syntax   of   the  AspectJ 
pointcut   language  with   a   new  construct   to   detect   data 
flows:   the  servlet   input   is  sanitized  if  and only  if   it   is 
written back on the servlet output stream. As far as we 







aspect   in  a  web application  server.  This  aspect  detects 
SQL   injection   and  XSS   attacks   in   requests   to   a  web 
application   and   from   this   to   a   database.   It  allows   the 
interception of all database accesses and the validation of 
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